To what extent has the EU established a ‘federal’ Europe?
A ‘federal’ Europe would consist of a Europe in which sovereignty is shared between EU institutions and member states, each of them enjoying a sphere of autonomous policy jurisdiction. Early dreams of an integrated Europe undoubtedly had a federalist dimension, in that people such as Monnet and Schuman looked to the creation of an association in which the sovereignty of European nations would be ‘pooled’. However, the extent to which this dream has been realised has been a matter of considerable debate.
• Those who argue that the EU has significant federalist features often point out that the Treaty of Rome (1957) looked to make countries relate to one another on the basis of supranationalism, suggesting that member states should hand over sovereignty on certain issues, allowing European bodies to impose their will on member states. The supranational character of the EU is more evident in certain bodies than in others. It is particularly evident in the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. Federal features were also built into the EEC/EC/EU through the introduction of qualified majority voting (QMV), which, as it allows member states to be outvoted on issues, has implications for sovereignty. Many also argue that the process of European integration has gradually transformed the EC/EU from being a confederation of independent states to becoming an organisation with federal-type features. The phases in this process include the progressive extension of QMV and restrictions on the national veto over a range of issues due to the passage of the Single European Act (1986),the Maastricht Treaty(1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2001). A further expansion of QMV is proposed in the Lisbon Treaty. It has been clearly established since the 1980s that EU law has precedence over the law of member states, a position established in the UK by the Factortame cases. European integration has gone furthest in those countries that are participating in monetary union, which have effectively ceded economic sovereignty to the EU in certain areas.
• However, others argue that the EU has an essentially intergovernmental character in that interaction usually takes place on the basis of sovereign independence. From this perspective, a ‘federal’ Europe has remained but a dream. Such a view is underpinned by the fact that member states retain power through the European Council. The EU is therefore not a form of supranational government, but a cross between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, something like the UN in which sovereign states agree to do things in the same way but not by abandoning sovereignty. The idea of a European ‘superstate’ is therefore a myth. Although the national veto has been reduced in scope, it continues to be applied to important areas of policy-making, such as taxation, foreign and defence policy. The flexibility of decision-making within the EU has also been maintained through ‘opt-outs’, which some member states have successfully negotiated in relation to policy areas that affect vital national interests. This has allowed, for example, members states such as the UK to opt-out from monetary union.
A ‘federal’ Europe would consist of a Europe in which sovereignty is shared between EU institutions and member states, each of them enjoying a sphere of autonomous policy jurisdiction. Early dreams of an integrated Europe undoubtedly had a federalist dimension, in that people such as Monnet and Schuman looked to the creation of an association in which the sovereignty of European nations would be ‘pooled’. However, the extent to which this dream has been realised has been a matter of considerable debate.
• Those who argue that the EU has significant federalist features often point out that the Treaty of Rome (1957) looked to make countries relate to one another on the basis of supranationalism, suggesting that member states should hand over sovereignty on certain issues, allowing European bodies to impose their will on member states. The supranational character of the EU is more evident in certain bodies than in others. It is particularly evident in the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. Federal features were also built into the EEC/EC/EU through the introduction of qualified majority voting (QMV), which, as it allows member states to be outvoted on issues, has implications for sovereignty. Many also argue that the process of European integration has gradually transformed the EC/EU from being a confederation of independent states to becoming an organisation with federal-type features. The phases in this process include the progressive extension of QMV and restrictions on the national veto over a range of issues due to the passage of the Single European Act (1986),the Maastricht Treaty(1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2001). A further expansion of QMV is proposed in the Lisbon Treaty. It has been clearly established since the 1980s that EU law has precedence over the law of member states, a position established in the UK by the Factortame cases. European integration has gone furthest in those countries that are participating in monetary union, which have effectively ceded economic sovereignty to the EU in certain areas.
• However, others argue that the EU has an essentially intergovernmental character in that interaction usually takes place on the basis of sovereign independence. From this perspective, a ‘federal’ Europe has remained but a dream. Such a view is underpinned by the fact that member states retain power through the European Council. The EU is therefore not a form of supranational government, but a cross between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, something like the UN in which sovereign states agree to do things in the same way but not by abandoning sovereignty. The idea of a European ‘superstate’ is therefore a myth. Although the national veto has been reduced in scope, it continues to be applied to important areas of policy-making, such as taxation, foreign and defence policy. The flexibility of decision-making within the EU has also been maintained through ‘opt-outs’, which some member states have successfully negotiated in relation to policy areas that affect vital national interests. This has allowed, for example, members states such as the UK to opt-out from monetary union.